The protection of the fundamental rights of our children represents the future of our planet. Over the last years, authorities from Western European countries claimed to be confronted with various problems caused by the phenomenon of migration and the presence in their country of Roma ethnic minority[1] coming from East European countries. One of the most visible source of anxiety is related to begging[2] on the public space of the cities[3] and the increasingly visible involvement of children[4] in begging activities.[5]

How has children’s presence in this unsuitable position occurred? What prevents authorities from taking actions towards the active social protection and assistance of these children in line with their dramatic situation and the status as children?

In this paper I will critically examine a number of sociological explanations’ for the presence of Roma children in begging and also to consider what is the position of the state in relation to protection of their children’s rights and their best interest.

I argue that the state is producing a new form of ”institutional racism”[6] under a cover of „unintentional racism”[7] by turning a blind eye to the children’s universal rights in order to stigmatize and restrict social and geographical mobility of Roma ethnic minority due to their ethnic origin.

This present effort is based on the analysis of the phenomenon, of its complexity as well as of its socio-economic and political implications. Therefore some theoretical aspects of social and political behaviour require clarification, and also the identification of how best to limit and control any type of social or institutional performance in relation with racism. I will study this processes through a sociological perspective of its manifestation respectively as a social process that involves many stages, different actors, the relationship between these actors, and factors associated with it.

The relationship between money and politics is inevitable, widespread and probably endless. In this regard, such a relationship is logical given the fact that political parties need money to participate in politics and maintain cohesion among the party members. The position of holding the power in the society that is given to the political parties, demands also a certain extent of responsibility and accountability towards its constituency (Carey & Reynolds, 2007). Therefore, the way in which political finances affect the relationship of political parties, and their members, constituents and the general public is essential for the quality of democracy functioning (Burnell, 1998). As such, political finances sustain and enhance the political debate and stimulate the internal democracy within the party.

In this context, the political parties in Macedonia follow the well-known pattern between money and politics - access to political power facilitates access to money, and access to money buys political influence. Frequently, governing parties use the administrative resources—state powers and funds in “rewarding allies” and “punishing opponents”. Until now, the political battle in Macedonia is between the two biggest Macedonian and Albanian parties. The other small parties (including the Roma ones) are the “outside players”, usually joining the coalition government. It follows that the small political parties are just illustrative marionettes of the bigger parties, even though they can be a game changer during the elections (local or presidential). Although the small political parties manifest monopolistic power within the party (all the power is in the arms of the leader) they do not know to use their power or are limited in practicing it within the coalition government.

Regarding the role and responsibility of the Roma parties in the current coalition government in Macedonia, this analysis indicates the imbalance between the exercises of their political power given the financial opportunities. In other words, this means that Roma political parties take the legitimacy from the Roma electorate while the roles and responsibilities are delegated by the coalition parties in the government. Hence, it appears that the "greater responsibility" of Roma political parties and the weak financial power results in reduced credibility in the Roma community. In the case of the Roma political parties, promises are determined by the major coalition partners and serve their interests. These developments point out that Roma political parties have post – election agreements for sharing the financial "cake” after the election. However, typically the position of political parties is determined from the costs-benefit logic, calculation the future benefits (power, authority, positions in public administration, public policies) with their costs (administration, political campaigns)

Therefore, in this analysis we argue that party financing has a crucial role in the internal democratization of the Roma political parties and contributes to better practice of their power in the coalition government. Furthermore, this analysis provides an analytical framework through which party finance can be analyzed and propose strategies for financing the Roma political parties.